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Abstract 
Dashang, as a new form of the pay-what-you-want (PWYW) pricing paradigm, has 
emerged on social media platforms, especially in China. In the settings of Dashang, 
consumers are free to pay any amount to the authors or broadcasters after they have 
consumed some information goods. Compared with traditional offline scenes, Dashang 
has incorporated more social elements and platform engagements. However, it remains 
unelucidated what are the critical factors that motivate users to pay. In this paper, we 
investigate whether and how social signals, such as the disclosed information about the 
volume of paid people, may influence consumers’ willingness to pay under Dashang. An 
ambivalent framework is proposed, suggesting that such social signals may have both 
positive and negative effects on voluntary payment. The manuscript is to present the 
theoretical development of the research, aiming to reveal the benefits and liabilities of the 
social signal disclosure mechanism. 
Keywords:  Dashang, PWYW, social media, social signals 
Introduction 
PWYW (Pay-What-You-Want) is a participative pricing mechanism whereby customers have maximum 
control over the price they pay (Kim et al. 2009). With PWYW the buyer can pay any amount for the product 
or service, including nothing (Gneezy et al. 2010).  This is a novel business model that has great appeal to 
sellers in various industries such as museums, software, and charity sales (Schmidt et al. 2014). In recent 
years, a new type of PWYW is emerging in vogue, especially in China, which is called “Dashang”. In the 
settings of Dashang, consumers are free to pay any amount to the authors or broadcasters after they have 
consumed some information goods, such as reading articles and watching videos on social media platforms. 
Social media platforms in China, such as Sina Weibo and Wechat, have widely adopted Dashang as a 
substantial incentive mechanism to boost the contribution of user-generated content (UGC).  
Despite the prevalence, it remains unelucidated what are the critical factors that motivate users to pay in 
the settings of Dashang. Notably, in 2016, Youtube deployed a feature called “Fan Funding,” which is similar 
to Dashang, allowing users to pay video creator in a PWYW manner. However, the attempt turned out to be 
unsuccessful and Youtube officially canceled the “Fan Funding” feature in early 2017. The different fates of 
Dashang and “Fan Funding” make it particularly intriguing to explore the behavioral mechanisms in such 
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novel practices. Prior literature has suggested that various factors may motivate consumers’ voluntary 
payment behavior in PWYW. However, Dashang is different from traditional PWYW settings in many 
aspects. First, Dashang targets to information products, whose cost structures and pricing mechanisms are 
both different from traditional goods like tickets or dinners sold in other PWYW scenes. Second, in Dashang, 
there is the intervention of the platforms in the process of Dashang in addition to buyers and sellers. Third, 
many social elements have been injected in such as social relationships and social signals. Therefore, the 
findings in traditional PWYW may not effectively explain the behavioral mechanisms in the context of 
Dashang. 
Theoretically, the emergence of Dashang provides us with a novel perspective for extending our 
understanding about the voluntary payment behaviors and the price-generation mechanisms of 
information goods in the context of social media. Practically, platforms are in need of understanding the 
payment behavior in Dashang, in order to design more effective policies and functions to facilitate the 
growth of this pricing paradigm. A common practice in many social media platforms is to disclose the 
information “volume of paid people” to incent more user to pay, but is such information disclosure a good 
design? If more people have paid, will the consumer be more likely to pay? 
Volume of paid people represents a kind of social signals, which shows what others have done or expressed 
in the same situations. Social signals, as a reference, often imperceptibly affect consumers’ decisions. As 
studies on traditional PWYW have shown, consumer satisfaction is an important driver for consumers to 
pay (Gerpott 2017). When a stronger social signal of paid people has been observed, consumers’ satisfaction 
will be confirmed and they may pay more for conformity in the social context. In addition, a stronger social 
signal of paid people may also serve as social norms. Therefore, consumers with higher fairness concerns 
will be more likely to pay when the volume of paid people is higher, otherwise they will feel embarrassed 
and upset. On the other hand, consumers also pay to support and encourage the author under the altruistic 
motivations. If a strong social signal has been observed to pay for the author, he/she may think it is not very 
necessary to continue paying when considering the diminishing utilities for the author. The altruistic 
motivation will thus weakly impair consumers’ willingness to pay. 
In this sense, it is unclear whether the social signal of a large volume of paid people will make a consumer 
more likely to pay. Answering this question is critical to the mechanism design of platforms, as well as the 
income of authors and the attractiveness of platforms. Therefore, in this paper, we investigate the research 
question: how the social signals of “volume of paid people” affect consumers’ willingness to pay in online 
PWYW? 
Literature Review 
In this section, we draw on two relevant and essential streams of literature, namely PWYW, and social 
signals and social norms in payment decisions. 
PWYW 
The PWYW procedure is a variant of “voluntary market payment mechanisms,” which additionally includes 
tipping, donations, gift giving, and trust-based billing methods (“honor systems”). PWYW distinguishes 
from the others on many aspects. According to Gerpott (2017), PWYW concentrates on offering some 
financial compensations for the vendor’s core product rather than its ancillary product. Furthermore, 
customers are not paying out of pro-social or ethical motivations like in charity donations, they just pay for 
themselves. Finally, in a PWYW setting sellers do not appeal to buyers to pay a (fixed) price named 
beforehand. 
There are many factors that may affect the level of the prices paid by consumers under PWYW. These factors 
can be subdivided into five classes, namely (1) the buyers, (2) the sellers, (3) the focal sales objects, (4) the 
market context, and (5) the design of the PWYW procedure (Gerpott 2017). In this paper, consumers’ 
willingness to pay will be explored, mainly from the buyer perspective. First, among socio-demographic 
factors, age, gender, and income are the most frequently discussed. Although investigation on age and 
gender has yielded mixed results (Borck et al. 2006; Waskow et al. 2016), the association between income 
and payment is always positive (Kim et al. 2009). Second, internal reference price, which reflects consumers’ 
past experience or their assumption of prices that have already been paid by others, has a positive effect in 
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the PWYW settings (Roy 2015). Third, product or service satisfaction is positively correlated with voluntary 
prices paid in post-consumption situations (Borck et al. 2006; Kim et al. 2009). Furthermore, social 
preferences are often emphasized by the PWYW literature as a critical factor for business performance 
(Gerpott 2017). Among the social preferences factors, altruism and fairness have attracted the most 
attention. Altruism mainly measures the helping tendency of persons without expecting one-to-one 
compensatory returns from others (Gerpott 2017). Most studies show positive evidences between altruism 
and magnitude of voluntary payment (Kim et al. 2009). Meanwhile, most studies report significantly 
positive impact of buyers’ “preference for fairness” on payment (Gerpott 2017). In addition to fairness and 
altruism, self-image concerns have also attracted the attentions of scholars. Gneezy et al. (2012) has 
introduced the concept of identity into economic modeling and demonstrated that identity confirming 
choices enhance consumer utility. When a person behaves pro-socially, he/she is judged more positively by 
others and, importantly, by him/herself. Thus, image motivation usually has positive effects under PWYW. 
Finally, buyers’ price consciousness may negatively affect PWYW prices paid (Kim et al. 2009). 
Social Signals and Social Norms in Payment Decisions 
Consumers’ opinions of a product are essential in his or her payment decisions. It has been recognized that 
two important factors can shape consumers' opinions, which are interpersonal persuasion and conformity. 
Consumers tend to be influenced by other consumers through social interactions in social contexts (Dewan 
et al. 2017). Social signals are crucial in social interactions and can be divided into two categories. The first 
is relation-based social signals, which are observed by individuals following others they know, such as 
online friends. The other is crowd-based signals, such as volume of “shares,” “comments,” “likes,” and past 
sales. Prior literature has suggested that crowd-based signals usually play positive roles in consumers’ 
payment decisions. For example, consumers will observe the purchase actions of all previous individuals to 
form their beliefs and motive the purchase decisions (Chen et al. 2011). Metzger et al. (2010) also report 
that social cues are often seen as useful strategies for judging the credibility of online information and these 
social cues can often lead to “herd behavior” in purchase decisions. Therefore, in this paper, we focus on 
the effects of crowd-based social signals on consumers’ payment decisions under Dashang.  
Furthermore, following the definition and framework proposed by Godes et al. (2005), we focus on two 
common forms of social interactions, word-of-mouth (WOM) and observational learning (OL). In general, 
WOM refers to the dissemination of information (e.g. opinions and recommendations) through 
interpersonal communications (Chen et al. 2011). Observational learning information contains the discrete 
signals expressed by the actions of other consumers, whereas the reasons behind their actions are not 
directly expressed (Chen et al. 2011), such as cumulative purchases. Prior studies have found that both 
WOM and OL have important impacts on consumers all through the product lifetime, including consumers’ 
purchase decision-making process (Dewan et al. 2017). Chen et al. (2011) discovered that not only do WOM 
and OL individually drive purchase decisions, but the interaction of the two processes also has significant 
effects on consumers’ decision-making. 
Research has also suggested that consumers are more likely to engage in pro-social actions when social 
norms exist. Generally, social norms are divided into two categories (White and Simpson 2013). The first is 
descriptive norms, which deal with the perceived prevalence or typicality towards a certain behavior, and 
the second type is injunctive norms, which refer to the perceived social approval/disapproval degree for the 
behavior (Cialdini et al. 1991). White and Simpson (2013) suggest that social norms are the most effective 
way to encourage sustainable consumption behaviors. 
However, it remain un-elucidated how social factors may affect PWYW. Most prior studies in offline PWYW 
focus on the influence of anonymity on the amount of payment, but the conclusions are inconsistent. For 
example, Regner and Riener (2012) find that reducing the degree of anonymity between buyers and sellers 
would increase the average payment amount, but would reduce the total number of purchases and the total 
income. In another experiment, Gneezy et al. (2012) find that consumers pay more under anonymization. 
One article that comes closest to us is Racherla et al. (2011), which investigates whether local or global social 
information (how many other friends/consumers have purchased the app) is more effective on consumers’ 
willingness to pay under APP purchase circumstance. However, they do not consider the influence of paid 
consumers' volume, which is the focus of this paper. 
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Research Model and Hypotheses Development 
We build a research model to explain the main motives to consumers' willingness to pay of an article with 
different volumes of paid people by integrating traditional the PWYW and social signals literature (see 
Figure 1). Specially, we propose that consumer satisfaction, fairness concerns, and altruism are the main 
drivers for voluntary payment, following previous PWYW studies, but these effects are influenced by the 
volume of paid people, which is disclosed by online platforms.  
 
 
Figure 1.  Research Model 
Main Motives in PWYW 
The first important factor that determines post-consumption price is consumer satisfaction. In our study, 
satisfaction refers to the consumer's post-consumption evaluation of the perceived information 
quality/value for the article. If the author offers an article with high quality that will enable readers to obtain 
new or interesting knowledge, then the consumer's satisfaction will increase (Bolton 1998). Satisfaction 
may lead to a higher willingness to pay. Prior evidences in other PWYW scenes support this conjecture and 
mostly find that satisfaction is significantly positively correlated with prices paid voluntarily after 
consumption (Borck et al. 2006; Schmidt et al. 2014). Under Dashang, consumers choose to pay at the 
rational level because of the identification of the content. Thus, we suggest that consumers will have 
stronger willingness to pay given a higher satisfaction to an article. 
H1: Consumer with higher satisfaction to an article will have higher willingness to pay. 
In addition to economic attributes, PWYW also has pro-social properties. Contrary to the assumption of a 
rational economic manner, consumers still choose to pay when they are not required to. Prior literature has 
suggested two main social preferences under PWYW, which are fairness concerns and altruism. Fairness 
concerns reflect consumers’ attitudes that they should reward the sellers according to the goods they have 
got by sharing an “adequate” proportional return in voluntary payment scenes  (Natter and Kaufmann 2015; 
Roy et al. 2016). The ultimatum game, one of the most famous microeconomic experiments (Fehr and 
Schmidt 2001), indicates that many consumers tend to reject a selfish decision and that their behaviors are 
mainly driven by fairness concerns. According to equity theory, fairness implies a proportional allocation 
of resources or returns in social exchange (Carrell and Dittrich 1978). Thus, we expect that the consumer 
will reward the seller in appropriate monetary units to keep the balance of fairness when he/she has 
consumed the product or service. Prior literature on PWYW has reported positive associations between 
consumers’ “preferences for fairness” and the level of their voluntary payments (Lee et al. 2015). Thus, if a 
consumer chooses a lower pay under Dashang, he/she will also anticipate the distress of the incurred 
inequity. Thus: 
H2: Fairness concerns have a positive influence on consumer's willing to pay. 
Beyond the concerns of fairness, buyers also pay higher prices because of altruism (Maner and Gailliot 
2007). Academics further distinguish between pure altruistic motives (Becker 1974) and impure altruistic 
motives (Andreoni 1989). Starting with pure altruistic oriented motives, donors' willingness to behave pro-
social without caring for any rewards. For the impure altruistic motives, academics stress that people can 
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gain a warm glow utility from the act of giving and helping (Andreoni 1989; Isen 1970). Altruism also exists 
in Dashang. On the one hand, consumers want to support and encourage authors out of pure altruistic 
motives. On the other hand, from impure altruistic motives, Dashang is also conducive to the construction 
of consumers' self-image, which can enhance their sense of honor, participation, sense of responsibility and 
sense of achievement. Therefore, we assume that consumers with higher altruistic motivations will be more 
likely to pay. 
H3: Consumer with higher altruistic motivations will be more willing to pay. 
The Roles of Social Signals in PWYW 
Volume of paid people is a kind of crowd-based social signals, which is disclosed by the platform. Such a 
social signal has the favor of both WOM and OL and may play several roles in consumers' decision making. 
Considering that consumers’ payment behaviors occur after experiencing the product, consumers’ payment 
intentions may be initially formed and the social learning process may be more likely to serve as regulatory 
and complementary roles as prior literature suggested (Bikhchandani et al. 1998). First, the effect of 
consumer satisfaction on willingness to pay is contingent on how many others have paid. Volume of paid 
people is an important information for consumers. Online information is often highly uncertain and 
difficult to judge the credibility (Wang and Chang 2013), even if they've already been read. Consumers are 
influenced by the majority in their social group because a larger volume of the same opinion is considered 
more authoritative, diagnostic and persuasive (Granovetter and Soong 1988). If the customer has read the 
article and is satisfied with it, when he or she sees that many people have paid, a signal of good product 
value can be perceived and the customer’s satisfaction will be confirmed, which will strength his or her 
willingness to pay. Otherwise, if few people have paid for this article, he or she will doubt his or her 
judgement and become reluctant to pay, because of the tendency to keep the conformity with others. Thus, 
we propose that: 
H4: Volume of paid people positively moderates the positive relationship between consumer 
satisfaction and willingness to pay, such that when the volume is higher, the positive relationship 
is stronger. 
In addition, we propose that the positive effect of consumers’ fairness concerns on willingness to pay is 
contingent on volume of paid people such that when the volume is higher, the positive effect is stronger. 
First, if a consumer pays for the article even when he or she is not necessary to do so, it indicates that the 
consumer is voluntary to reward the author’s efforts out of fairness concerns. Furthermore, a higher volume 
of paid people can demonstrate it is descriptive norm that implies “pay for the articles you like or gain 
knowledge from, is approved and welcomed by the majority or society”. Thus, when many people have been 
observed to pay for the article, the consumer with fairness concerns will be more likely to conform to societal 
expectations of fairness and otherwise avoid displeasing cognitive dissonance (Marett et al. 2012), which 
would make him/her more likely to pay, compared with the case that the volume of paid people is lower. 
Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H5: Volume of paid people positively moderates the positive relationship between consumer’s 
fairness concern and willingness to pay, such that when the volume is higher, the positive 
relationship is stronger.   
However, there may exist negative effects if volume of paid people is higher. According to the theory of 
diffusion of responsibility, a person is less likely to take responsibility for action or inaction when others 
are present (Wegner and Schaefer 1978). As a form of attribution, the individual assumes that others either 
are responsible for taking action or have already done so (Wegner and Schaefer 1978). As Guy (1988) 
demonstrates, while it appears that people do have a strong motivation to help others, the motivation is 
translated into behavior only after the individual has completed a decision process that leads to that 
behavior. The decision process leading to helping others is composed of awareness of another person in 
need, interpretation of the situation, recognition of personal responsibility, perception of 
ability/competence to help, and implementation of the helping action. The helping behavior may actually 
diminish if it is known that others have given and thus supposedly provided the needed help (Wegner and 
Schaefer 1978). The presence of other people can destroy the helping decision process through dispelling 
awareness of another person in need, interpretation of the situation, recognition of personal responsibility, 
and finally negate the potential helping behavior. Thus, we propose that: 
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H6: Volume of paid people negatively moderates the positive relationship between consumer 
altruism and willingness to pay, such that when the volume is higher, the positive relationship is 
weaker. 
Notably, an alternative possibility is that there may exist an inverted U-shaped relationship between volume 
of paid people and consumers’ willingness to pay. In other words, when the volume increases, its negative 
effect will be more central. We may investigate such a possible relationship in future analyses. In addition, 
prior studies have suggested some other factors that may affect consumer’s willingness to pay. Particularly, 
there is a positive effect of income on willingness to pay, while price-conscious consumers are likely to shop 
for special offers and will increase their deal profit when PWYW implemented. In addition, a consumer’s 
internal reference price also has a positive effect on the voluntary payment (Kim et al. 2009). We will control 
for these confounding factors in the research design, which will be discussed in the next section.  
Research Design 
Before the description of our research design details, the decision-making process of consumers in Dashang 
needs to be further clarified.  At present, most platforms adopt the form of paying after experienced, which 
is as Figure 2 shows. Consumers view an article first, form their preliminary view to the article, for example, 
satisfactory or not, then catch sight of how many people have paid, helping them to update their 
understanding of the article. Finally, they decide how much they would like to pay, including nothing. Our 
research design will also consist of such a process. 
 
Figure 2.  The Process of Dashang for an Article 
 
Our research model will be evaluated by laboratory experiments through sharing the articles to read and 
manipulating volume of paid people to different participants. A total of 180 participants are planned to be 
recruited from young people aged between 17 to 33, which is in accordance with the main payment group 
in Sina Weibo (Weibo 2015). Each participant will be randomly assigned into one of five experimental 
groups or control group, and each group will contain 30 participants.  The specific experimental process 
can be seen in Figure 3. First, the participants are asked to sign up and briefed with the introduction of our 
experiment. Each participant will be given 50 RMB as start-up funds used for Dashang in the experiment, 
the remaining account will be part of experiment reward to the participants, and excess account will be 
compensated to participants after the experiment. The payment of start-up funds and the payment of 
Dashang in the experiment are all made through WeChat QR code, which is the mainstream way of digital 
payment in China nowadays.  Then a survey will be carried out to obtain the subjects’ income, preference 
price, price consciousness, and demographics, which will be controlled for in the follow-up analyses. Third, 
three articles from the finance field will be presented to be read by the participants, each one for at least 10 
minutes. The volume of paid people will appear at the end of each article. We will vary it with five different 
magnitude and randomly assign it to different experimental groups. After the subjects have already read 
the article, they should decide whether they would like to pay and how much to pay through Wechat 
payment. Their actual payment amount will be observed as their willingness to pay. In the experiment, an 
important question is how to determine the volume of paid people presented in different experimental 
groups. According to the data we got from one of the famous Chinese social media in 2015, the maximum 
volume of paid people of a single article is 23,218, so the span of paid people volume in the experiment will 
be restricted within 0 to 23,218, which can be more in line with the actual situation. Furthermore, we cut 
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[0,23218] into five distinct experimental groups depending on different magnitudes, which is [1,9], [10,99], 
[100,999], [1000,9999], [10000,23218]. For each experimental group, a random number will be used to 
determine the final volume of paid people presented to the participants. Finally, another survey, including 
the subjects’ satisfaction, fairness concerns, and altruism in the process of Dashang for the last article, will 
be conducted before they finish the experiment.  Although the three articles will be read and decided 
whether to pay in the experiment, our questionnaire will only be presented after the final payments for the 
third article. On the one hand, three articles rather than one article to be read and paid can help participants 
become more familiar with our experimental procedure, and the last payment will be relatively stable. On 
the other hand, the questionnaire is not presented after the first two article, in order not to misguide to the 
participants’ psychological process in their payment decisions. The three articles will be chosen from a 
mainstream social media in China and high quality articles will be intentionally selected, because the 
general goal is to encourage more people to pay for good works. The volume of paid people of the first two 
articles will be set in the same interval, that is [100,999], which is the middle span of our treatment. While 
the volume of the last article, which is our experiment focus, will vary between different groups. The order 
of appearance of the three articles will always be the same for different groups. 
 
Figure 3.  Experimental Flow Chart 
 
For the constructs to be measured, we draw upon the relevant literature and adapt the measurement items 
according to the Dashang context, as is shown in Table 1. 
Expected Outcomes and Future Plans 
This paper is trying to reveal the advantages and disadvantages of the social signal disclosure mechanism 
in PWYW where little attention has paid in prior literature. Our results are expected to demonstrate that 
social signals, specifically volume of paid people in our context, will not monotonously increase consumers' 
willingness to pay. They have inverted-U-shaped relationships with willingness to pay. Although social 
signals can imply higher product value and evoke more payment for fear of unfairness, it may also destroy 
consumers’ willingness to pay. The results will contribute to the cross-domain streams of literature, 
including PWYW and social interactions. The mechanisms explained may inspire platforms that disclose 
the volume of paid people information is not always good in real applications. When the volume exceeds a 
certain level, it may be a wise choice not to display such a social signal incrementally. 
Our work is on-going to extend this research program in the several ways. First, we will perfect and perform 
the experiment to test our hypotheses, and evaluate whether the research model is appropriate. Second, in 
this paper we have analyzed only one kind of social signals, whereas many other signals such as the amount 
others have paid and the identities of those who has paid may also play important and different roles in the 
process of consumers’ decision-making in the context of Dashang. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine 
these mechanisms and investigate which one is more effective in real applications. 
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Table 1. Constructs and Measurement Items 
Construct Items Literature 
Satisfaction 
I am satisfied with the article. 
Kim et al. (2009) I liked the article. 
I gained knowledge from the article. 
Fairness concerns It would be unfair to pay nothing for the author. Kunter (2015) 
Altruism 
I love to support and encourage the author. International 
personality item 
pool 
I am concerned about the author. 
I want to make the author feel welcome 
Reference price What did you pay for the similar article in your last 
Dashang? 
Bearden et al. 
(1992) 
Price consciousness 
Before I buy a product, I often check the prices of different 
retailers to obtain the best benefit. Donthu and 
Gilliland (1996) I usually purchase items on sale only. 
I usually purchase the cheapest item. 
Income Please state your monthly income. Coleman (1983) 
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